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Abstract. This paper studies the resilient routing and (in-band) fast
failover mechanisms supported in Software-Defined Networks (SDN). We
analyze the potential benefits and limitations of such failover mechanisms,
and focus on two main metrics: (1) correctness (in terms of connectivity
and loop-freeness) and (2) load-balancing. We make the following contri-
butions. First, we show that in the worst-case (i.e., under adversarial link
failures), the usefulness of local failover is rather limited: already a small
number of failures will violate connectivity properties under any fast
failover policy, even though the underlying substrate network remains
highly connected. We then present randomized and deterministic algo-
rithms to compute resilient forwarding sets; these algorithms achieve an
almost optimal tradeoff. Our worst-case analysis is complemented with a
simulation study.
1 Introduction
The software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm separates the control plane from
the network data plane, and introduces a (software) controller that manages the
flows in the network from a (logically) centralized perspective. This architecture
has the potential to make the network management and operation more flexible
and simpler, and to enable faster innovation also in the network core. For example,
the controller may exploit application and network state information (including
the switches under its control) to optimize the routing of the flows through the
network, e.g., to implement isolation properties or improve performance.
However, the separation of the control from the data plane may have draw-
backs. For example, a reactive flow control can introduce higher latencies due to
the interaction of the switch with the remote controller. Moreover, the separation
raises the question of what happens if the switches lose connectivity to the con-
troller. One solution to mitigate these problems is to keep certain functionality
closer to the switches or in the data plane [8].
An important tradeoff occurs in the context of network failures: Theoretically,
e.g., a link failure, is best handled by the controller which has the logic to
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update forwarding rules according to the current network policies. However, as
the indirection via the controller may take too long, modern network designs
incorporate failover (or “backup”) paths into the (switches’ or routers’) forwarding
tables. For example, OpenFlow (since the 1.1 specification [5]), incorporates such
a fast failover mechanism: it allows to predefine resilient and in-band failover
routes which kick in upon a topological change. Only after the failover took place,
the controller may learn about the new situation and install forwarding (and
failover) rules accordingly.
Our Contributions. Given that the in-band failover tables need to be
pre-computed and the corresponding rules are based on limited local network
information only, we ask the question: “Can you shoot in your foot with local
fast failover?” We formalize a simplified local failover problem, and first assume
a conservative (or worst-case) perspective where link failures are chosen by an
adversary who knows the entire network and all the pre-installed failover rules.
For this setting, we provide a lower bound which shows that a safe fast failover
can potentially come at a high network load, especially if the failover rules are
destination-based only (Section 2). We then present randomized and deterministic
algorithms to pre-compute resilient forwarding sets and show that the algorithms
are (almost) optimal in the sense that they match the lower bound mentioned
above (Section 3). Finally, we report on a simulation study (Section 4) which
indicates that under random link failures, local fast failover performs better in
general. In the Appendix, we give the formal specification of the two additional
algorithms used in our simulations, and we extend the discussion to alternative
adversary and traffic models.
Model and Terminology. We attend to the following model. We assume
an SDN-network G = (V,E) with n switches (or nodes) V = {v1, . . . , vn} (e.g.,
OpenFlow switches) connected by bidirectional links E. We assume that all nodes
are directly connected, i.e., G forms a full mesh (a clique). This network serves an
all-to-one communication pattern where any node vi ∈ V \ {vn} communicates
with a single destination vn; in other words, we have n−1 communicating (source-
destination) pairs. Henceforth, by slightly abusing terminology, we will refer to
the corresponding n− 1 communication paths as the flows F = {f1, . . . , fn−1}.
The source-destination flows are unsplittable, i.e., each flow fi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
travels along a single path. For simplicity, we will assume that all flows fi carry a
constant amount of traffic w = w(fi), and that edge capacities e ∈ E are infinite.
In order to ensure an efficient failover, each switch v ∈ V can store the
following kind of failover rules: Each rule r ∈ R considers a specific local failure
scenario, namely the set of failed incident links, and defines an alternative
forwarding port for each source-destination pair. (This is slightly more general
than what is provided e.g., by OpenFlow today: in OpenFlow, all paths need
to resort to the same failover port, rending the connectivity-load tradeoff even
worse.)
Formally, let Γ (v) ∀v ∈ V denote the links (or equivalently: the switch ports)
incident to node v in G, and let FW(v) define how the source-destination pairs (or
flows) that are routed via node v (the “forwarding set”). A rule r is of the form:
r :
(
2Γ (v), FW(v)
) 7→ FW(v), that is, for each possible failure scenario 2Γ (v) (i.e.,
the subset of ports which failed at v), the failover rule defines an alternative set
of forwarding rules FW(v) at v. Note that the number of rules can theoretically be
large; however, as we will see, small rule tables are sufficient for the algorithms
presented in this paper.
We study failover schemes that pursue two goals: (1) Correctness: Each
source-destination pair is connected by a valid path; there are no forwarding
loops. (2) Performance: The resulting flow allocations are well balanced. Formally,
we want to minimize the load of the maximally loaded link in G after the failover:
min maxe∈E λ(e), where λ(e) describes the number of flows fi crossing edge e.
Henceforth, let λ̂ = maxe∈E λ(e) denote the maximum load.
For our randomized failover schemes, we will typically state our results with
high probability (short: w.h.p.): this means that the corresponding claim holds
with at least polynomial probability 1−1/nc for an arbitrary constant c. Moreover,
throughout this paper, log will refer to the binary logarithm.
2 You must shoot in your foot!
Let us first investigate the limitations of local failover mechanisms from a con-
servative worst-case perspective. Concretely, we will show that even in a fully
meshed network (i.e., a clique), a small number of link failures can either quickly
disrupt connectivity (i.e., the forwarding path of at least one source-destination
pair is incorrect), or entail a high load. This is true even though the remaining
physical network is still well connected: the minimum edge cut (short: mincut) is
high, and there still exist many disjoint paths connecting each source-destination
pair.
Theorem 1. No local failover scheme can tolerate n− 1 or more link failures
without disconnecting source-destination pairs, even though the remaining graph
(i.e., after the link failures) is still
⌊
n
2
⌋− 1-connected.
Proof. We consider a physical network that is fully meshed, and we assume a
traffic matrix where all nodes communicate with a single destination vn. To prove
our claim, we will construct a set of links failures that creates a loop, for any local
failover scheme. Consider a flow v1 → vn connecting the source-destination pair
(v1, vn). The idea is that whenever the flow from v1 would be directly forwarded
to vn in the absence of failures, we fail the corresponding physical link: that is,
if v1 would directly forward to vn, we fail (v1, vn). Similarly, if v1 forwards to
(the backup) node vi, and if vi would send to vn, we fail (vi, vn), etc. We do so
until the number of intermediate (backup) nodes for the flow v1 → vn becomes⌊
n
2
⌋− 1. This will require at most ⌊n2 ⌋− 1 failures (of links to vn) since every
such failure adds at least one intermediate node.
In the following, let us assume that the last link on the path v1 → vn is
(vk, vn). We simultaneously fail all the links (vk, v∗), where v∗ are all the nodes
that are not the intermediate nodes on the path v1 → vn, and not v1. So, there
are n− (⌊n2 ⌋− 1)− 1 nodes v∗ (the last minus 1 accounts for v1). By failing the
links to v∗, we left vk without a valid routing choice: All the remaining links
from vk point to nodes which are already on the path v1 → vn, and a loop is
inevitable.
In total, we have at most
⌊
n
2
⌋− 1 +n− (⌊n2 ⌋− 1)− 1 = n− 1 failures. Notice,
that the two nodes with the smallest degrees in the graph are the nodes vn and
vk. The latter is true since the first
⌊
n
2
⌋ − 1 failures were used to disconnect
links to vn, and another n−
⌊
n
2
⌋
failures were used to disconnect links from vk.
Formally, d(vn) = (n− 1)−
(⌊
n
2
⌋− 1)− 1, where the last minus 1 accounts for
the link (vk, vn). So, d(vn) = n− 1−
⌊
n
2
⌋ ≥ n2 − 1. And regarding the degree of
vk, we have: d(vk) = (n− 1)−
(
n− ⌊n2 ⌋) = ⌊n2 ⌋− 1. All the other nodes have a
degree of n− 2.
The network is still
⌊
n
2
⌋− 1 connected: the mincut of the network is at least⌊
n
2
⌋− 1. Consider some cut with k nodes on the one side of the cut, and n− k
nodes on the other side. Obviously, one of the sets has a size of at most
⌊
n
2
⌋
; let
us denote this smaller set by S. If S includes at least one of the nodes V \{vk, vn},
then the number of outgoing edges form the set is at least n− 2− (|S| − 1), thus
the mincut is at least n2 − 1. If S includes only both vk and vn, the mincut is at
least n− 1 (the link (vk, vn) was failed). If only one of the nodes {vk, vn} is in S,
then the mincut is at least
⌊
n
2
⌋− 1. 
Regarding the maximal link load, we have the following lower bound.
Theorem 2. For any local failover scheme tolerating ϕ link failures (0 < ϕ < n)
without disconnecting any source-destination pair, there exists a failure scenario
which results in a link load of at least λ̂ ≥ √ϕ, although the minimum edge cut
(mincut) of the network is still at least n− ϕ− 1.
Proof. Let us first describe an adversarial strategy that induces a high load: Recall
that in the absence of failures, each node vi (i 6= n) may use its direct link to
vn for forwarding. However, after some links failed, vi may need to resort to the
remaining (longer) paths from vi to vn. Since the failover scheme S tolerates ϕ
failures and vi remains connected to vn, S will fail over to one of ϕ+ 1 possible
paths. To see this, let vji (j ∈ [1, . . . , ϕ]) be one of the ϕ possible last hops on
the path (vi → · · · → vji → vn), and let us consider the paths generated by S:
(vi → vn),
(vi → · · · → v1i → vn),
(vi → · · · → v1i → · · · → v2i → vn),
. . .
(vi → · · · → v1i → · · · → v2i → · · · → vϕi → vn).
For example, the path (vi → · · · → v1i → vn) will be generated if the first failure
is link (vi, vn), and the path (vi → · · · → v1i → · · · → v2i → vn) if the second
failure is link (v1i , vn) (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Notice that the last hop v
j
i
is unique for every path; otherwise, the loop-freeness property would be violated.
vn
vi
vn
v1i
vi
vn
v1i
vi
v2i
vn
v1i
v3i
vi
v2i
Fig. 1. From left to right: failover path (vi → vn) where each time the last hop
to vn is failed.
For each i ∈ [1, . . . , n − 1] (i.e., for each possible source) consider the set
Ai = {vi, v1i , . . . , v
√
ϕ
i }, and accordingly, the multiset
⋃
iAi is of size |
⋃
iAi| =
(n− 1)(√ϕ+ 1) many nodes. Since we have n− 1 distinct nodes (we do not count
vn), by a counting argument, there exists a node w ∈
⋃
iAi which appears in at
least
√
ϕ sets Ai.
If for each i such that w ∈ Ai, the adversary will cause vi to route to vn via
w, then the load of the link (w, vn) will be at least
√
ϕ. This can be achieved by
failing at most
√
ϕ links to vn in each such set Ai. Thus, the adversary will fail√
ϕ×√ϕ = ϕ links incident to vn, while the maximum loaded link (w, vn) will
have a load of at least
√
ϕ.
It remains to prove that the network remains highly connected, despite these
failures: The proof is simple. In a clique network without failures, the mincut
is n − 1. In the worst case, each link failure will remove one link from some
cut, and hence the mincut must eventually be at least n− ϕ− 1. By the same
argument, there are at least n− ϕ− 1 many disjoint paths from each node vi to
the destination: initially, without failures, there are n− 1 disjoint paths (a direct
one and n− 1 indirect ones), and each failure affects at most one path. 
Interestingly, it can be proved analogously that if a failover rule only depends
on destination addresses, the situation is even worse.
Theorem 3. Consider any local destination-based failover scheme in a clique
graph. There exists a set of ϕ failures (0 < ϕ < n), such that the remaining graph
will have a mincut of n− ϕ− 1 and λ̂ ≥ ϕ.
Proof. In order to construct a bad example, we first fail the direct link (v1, vn),
and hence v1 will need to reroute to some path with the last node before vn
being some node vi. When we fail the link (vi, vn), vi will have to reroute and
some other node vj will become the last hop on the path to vn. We repeat this
strategy to fail the links from the newly selected last hop and the destination
vn. This results in a routing path v1 → · · · → vi → · · · → vj → · · · → w → vn
with at least ϕ intermediate nodes. Since the algorithm is destination-based, i.e.,
forwarding rules depend only on the destination address of a packet, the load
on the link (w, vn) will be at least ϕ+ 1: all the nodes on the path v1 → vn will
send their packets via the same route. 
3 How not to shoot in your foot!
We have seen that what can be achieved with local fast failover is rather limited.
On the positive side, this section shows that there exist algorithms to pre-
compute failover schemes which at least match the derived lower bounds: we
present algorithms to pre-compute robust failover paths that jointly optimize the
loop-freeness property and the load, i.e., find an almost optimal tradeoff.
Naturally, randomization can help to spread the communication load well, but
we must ensure that paths remain loop-free. We first present such a randomized
solution, discuss how to derandomize it, and finally look at deterministic failover
algorithms.
We introduce a family of failover schemes S which can be represented in a
generic matrix form δi,j . Any failover scheme instance in this family will always
forward a message directly to the destination if the corresponding link is available.
Otherwise, if a given node vi cannot reach the destination vn via (vi, vn), it will
resort to the sequence of alternatives represented as the row i in the matrix δi,·
(the “backup nodes” for vi): vi will first try to forward to node δi,1, if this link is
not available to node δi,2, and so on. Similarly and more generally, starting from
node δi,j , if the link (δi,j , vn) is not available, the failover scheme will try δi,j+1,
δi,j+2, etc. In summary, the matrix representation can be depicted as follows:
δ1,1, δ1,2, . . . , δ1,n−2
. . .
δi,1, δi,2, . . . , δi,n−2
. . .
δn−1,1, δn−1,2, . . . , δn−1,n−2
The following auxiliary claim characterizes the best adversarial strategy
against the failover schemes S.
Claim 4 For the family of failover schemes S, the highest load is induced if links
towards the destination node vn are failed.
Proof. To achieve a load of ϕ on some link, the adversary first needs to bring
at least ϕ flows to some node w. Consider a failover sequence δi,· in which w is
located at j’s position, i.e., δi,j = w. In order to bring the flow vi → vn to node
w, the adversary needs to fail at least j links (every failure requires at most a
single additional backup node). Thus, the adversary can remove the links to the
destination from every node δi,k, k < j and from the source vi. The optimality is
due to the fact that once one of the nodes δi,k, k < j appears in other sequences,
these failures are automatically reused: the links (δi,k, vn) already failed. If the
adversary would instead choose to fail other links (not towards the destination),
e.g., (δi,j , δi,j+1) , the failures can only be reused if the same link (and not only
an endpoint) appears in other sequences before w. Therefore, we conclude that
the strategy of failing the links to the destination is optimal: (1) it requires no
more failures to bring a specific flow to w than any other strategy, and (2) link
failures to the destination can strictly be reused more often than the failures of
links to any other nodes. 
3.1 Randomized Failover
What does a good failover matrix δi,j look like? Naively, one may choose the matrix
entries (i.e., the “failover ports”) uniformly at random from the set of next hops
which are still available, and depending on the source and destination address, in
order to balance the load. However, note that a random and independent choice
will quickly introduce loops in the forwarding sequences: it is likely that a switch
will forward traffic to a switch which was already visited before on the failover
path.
Thus, our randomized failover scheme RFS will choose random permutations,
i.e., for a source-destination pair (vi, vn), the sequence δi,1, δi,2, . . . , δi,n−2 (with
δi,j ∈ V \{vi, vn}) is always loop-free (deterministically). Technically, RFS draws
all δi,j uniformly at randomly from V \ {vi, vn} but eliminates repetitions (e.g.,
by redrawing a repeated node). We can show that RFS is almost optimal, in the
following sense.
Theorem 5. Using the RFS scheme, in order to create a maximum load of
λ̂ =
√
ϕ, the adversary will have to fail at least Ω
(
ϕ
logn
)
links w.h.p., where
0 < ϕ < n.
Proof. To create a link load of
√
ϕ with the minimal number of link failures, the
adversary must in particular be able to route at least
√
ϕ flows to some node
w. Given the
√
ϕ load on the node, in the best case (for the adversary), the
entire flow will be forwarded by w on a single outgoing link. (E.g., the link to
the destination vn.) We will show that w.h.p., it is impossible for the adversary
to route more than
√
ϕ flows to a single node.
The adversary can put a high load on some node w only if: 1) Node w is
located close to the beginning of many sequences (i.e., is in a small “prefix” of
the sequences); thus, a small number of failures is sufficient to redirect the flow
to w. 2) Many nodes appearing before w in the sequence prefixes occur early
in many other prefixes as well; thus, the adversary can “reuse” failed links to
redirect also other source-destination pairs. Note that these two requirements
may conflict, but to prove the lower bound on the number of required failures,
we can assume that both conditions are satisfied: the set of
√
ϕ sequences with
the largest number of node repetitions in the w-prefixes also have the shortest
w-prefixes.
With this intuition in mind, let us compute the probability that a node w
appears more than approximately log n times at position j. Let Y ji be an indicator
random variable that indicates whether w is located at position j ∈ [1, . . . , n−2] in
sequence i ∈ [1, . . . , n− 1]. Let Y j = ∑ni=1 Y ji be a random variable representing
the number of times that w appears at position j. Since the failover sequences are
random, Pr(Y ji = 1) =
1
n−2 (w is neither the source nor the destination) and thus,
∀j,E [Y j] = n−1n−2 . Applying the Chernoff bound on the sum of n i.i.d. Poisson
trials, we obtain (for any δ > 0):
Pr
(
Y j > (1 + δ)E
[
Y j
]) ≤ 2−δE[Y j]
Pr
(
Y j >
(1 + 3 log n)(n− 1)
n− 2
)
≤ 2−(3 logn)×n−1n−2
≤ 2−3 logn = 1/n3.
Let us denote z = (1+3 logn)(n−1)n−2 and rewrite:
Pr
(
Y j > z
) ≤ 1/n3.
We can now apply a union bound argument3 over all possible nodes w and over
all possible positions j, which yields that with probability at least 1 − 1n , any
node will appear no more than z times at each position.
The adversary needs to select the
√
ϕ sequences with the shortest w-prefixes.
For a chosen sequence i, let us denote by ki the prefix length for node w (the
prefix length includes w itself). Since each node will appear no more than z times
at each position (with probability of at least 1− 1n ) the minimum length of a total
prefix for any node w can be derived. Let us denote the minimum total prefix by
k. Clearly, k is minimized for the shortest possible prefixes ki. According to the
analysis above, with high probability, there are no more than z prefixes of length
1, no more than z prefixes of length 2, and so on. Therefore:
k =
√
ϕ∑
i=1
ki ≥
z∑
i=1
1 +
z∑
i=1
2 + · · ·+
z∑
i=1
√
ϕ
z
= z
(
1 + 2 + · · ·+
√
ϕ
z
)
=
ϕ+
√
ϕz
2z
≥ ϕ
2z
≥ ϕ
8 log n
. (1)
Eq. 1 is true since for n ≥ 6, (1+3 logn)(n−1)n−2 ≤ 8 log n.
In conclusion, we know that in order to achieve a load of
√
ϕ, the adversary
has to fail the entire total prefix of w that consists of at least ϕ8 logn nodes.
However, the nodes in the prefixes are not necessarily all distinct, and the number
of links the adversary needs to fail only depends on the distinct nodes in the total
prefix of the node w. The latter is true due to the fact that the best adversarial
strategy is to fail only the links to the destination since in this case every such
failure is reused once the same node appears again in the total prefix of w (see
Claim 4). Hence, we next compute the minimum number of distinct nodes D
in any set of k random nodes. As we are interested in lower bounding D, we
can choose k minimal, i.e., k = ϕ8 logn . The analysis follows from a balls-and-bins
3 The union bound argument says that the probability of the union of the events is no
greater than the sum of the probabilities of the individual events.
argument where bins represent node IDs and balls are the k positions that should
be failed by the adversary. Thus, D is a number of occupied bins (i.e., bins that
contain at least one ball). Let Di be a binary random variable indicating that the
i-th ball falls into an empty bin (i.e., D =
∑k
i=1Di). So, Pr(Di = 1) ≥ n−1−kn−1 .
Since k = ϕ8 logn and ϕ < n, we obtain that:
Pr(Di = 1) ≥ n− 1− k
n− 1 ≥
8 log n− 1
8 log n
≥ 0.8.
Thus, E[D] = kE[Di] ≥ 0.8k. Now we can apply the Chernoff bound (for any
δ ∈ (0, 1]):
Pr(D ≤ (1− δ)0.8k) ≤ Pr(D ≤ (1− δ)E[D])
≤ e−E[D]δ2/2 ≤ e−0.8kδ2/2.
By taking δ = 0.5 we obtain Pr(D ≤ 0.4k) ≤ e−0.1k.
It remains to prove that this bound still holds under the union bound for
all
(
n−1√
ϕ
)
possible sets of sequences that the adversary can choose. In other
words, we have to ensure that
(
n√
ϕ
)
e−0.1k ≤ 1n (we took a larger number, since:(
n√
ϕ
) ≥ (n−1√ϕ )). (
n√
ϕ
)
e−0.1k ≤ n√ϕe−0.1k = n√ϕe− ϕ80 logn (2)
= e
√
ϕ lnn− ϕ80 logn = eϕ
(
lnn√
ϕ− 180 logn
)
≤ eϕ
(
logn√
ϕ − 180 logn
)
.
For ϕ ≥ 822 log4 n, we have ( logn√ϕ − 180 logn ) ≤ −2822 logn , and hence
(
n√
ϕ
)
e−0.1k ≤
e
−2ϕ
822 logn ≤ e−2 log3 n ≤ 1n2 . Since
(
n√
ϕ
)
Pr(D ≤ 0.4k) = ( n√ϕ)Pr(D ≤ 0.4ϕ8 logn ) ≤ 1n2 ,
w.h.p., any set of
√
ϕ sequences (i.e., w-prefixes) will require Ω( ϕlogn ) failures. 
3.2 Deterministic Failover
Theoretically, the result of Theorem 5 can be derandomized, i.e., the RFS scheme
can deterministically ensure low loads. The idea is that we could verify whether
an (improbable) situation occurred and the random sequences generated by RFS
actually yield a high load (we just need to check all possible loads at any w); if
so, another set of random permutations is generated. However, this verification
is computationally expensive.
We hence now initiate the discussion of efficient deterministic schemes. In
particular, we propose an optimal failover scheme (which matches our lower
bound in Section 2), at least for small ϕ. Similar to RFS, the deterministic
failover scheme DFS is defined by a failover matrix δi,j ; however, here δi,j will
simply refer to a node’s index (and not the node itself): We define the index of
any node v` to be `− 1, i.e., the nodes {v1, v2, . . . , vn} are mapped to the indices
{0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. Given a destination node vn, DFS is defined by the following
index matrix:
1, 2, 4, 8, . . . ,
(
0 + 2blognc
)
mod n
2, 3, 5, 9, . . . ,
(
1 + 2blognc
)
mod n
3, 4, 6, 10 . . . ,
(
2 + 2blognc
)
mod n
. . .
In general, the index in sequence i ∈ [1, . . . , n−1] at position j ∈ [1, . . . , blog nc]
is δi,j = (i − 1) + 2j−1 mod n. For example, if the link (v1, vn) fails, v1 will
reroute via the node with index 1, i.e., via v2; and so on. We can show the
following result.
Theorem 6. The DFS scheme achieves a maximum load of λ̂ = O(
√
ϕ) in any
scenario with ϕ < blog nc failures.
Proof. We will prove something even stronger: the adversary cannot choose link
failures such that any node w forwards more than
√
ϕ flows. Clearly, an upper
bound on the node load is an upper bound on the (incident) links: in the worst
case, w will forward all traffic to the same link. To create a high load at some
node w, the adversary needs to find failover sequences in the matrix δi,j where
the node w appears close to the beginning of the sequence, and fail all the links
(vi, vn), where vi is a node preceding w in a sequence: i.e., the adversary fails the
total prefix of w. Note that failing the links to the destination is the best strategy
for the adversary as failures are automatically reusable in other sequences (see
Claim 4).
The following two claims will help us to show that the adversary wastes its
entire failure budget in order to achieve a maximum load of
√
ϕ.
Claim 7 Every node index participates in only blog nc sequences.
Proof. The DFS failover matrix is defined as δi,j = (i− 1) + 2j−1 mod n, where
i ∈ [1, . . . , n− 1] and j ∈ [1, . . . , blog nc]. From this construction, it follows that
there are no index repetitions in the matrix columns. Since there are blog nc
columns, the claim follows. 
Claim 8 For any node index `, all `-prefixes (sets of indices preceding ` in the
sequences) are disjoint.
Proof. Let us define m = i − 1 and k = ` − 1. The index in sequence m ∈
[0, . . . , n − 2] at position k ∈ [0, . . . , blog nc − 1] is m + 2k mod n. Consider
a sequence m′ where the index w appears at position k′ and a sequence m′′
where the index ` appears at position k′′. Without loss of generality, assume that
k′′ > k′. Let m′ + 2k
∗
mod n and m′′ + 2k
∗∗
mod n represent the indices in the
prefixes of ` in sequences m′ and m′′ accordingly. Assume by contradiction that
these indices are the same. We have that
m′ + 2k
′
= m′′ + 2k
′′
mod n
m′ + 2k
∗
= m′′ + 2k
∗∗
mod n (assumption)
and hence
m′ −m′′ = 2k′′ − 2k′ + n · C1
m′ −m′′ = 2k∗∗ − 2k∗ + n · C2
Therefore
2k
∗∗ − 2k′′ + 2k′ − 2k∗ = n · C3
where C1, C2 and C3 are some integer constants.
Notice that max(2k
∗∗
, 2k
′′
, 2k
′
, 2k
∗
) < n, so the only possible values for C3
are: {−1, 0, 1}. Moreover, (2k∗∗ − 2k′′) < 0, while (2k′ − 2k∗) > 0, and since the
absolute value of these differences is bounded by 2blognc−1 ≤ 0.5n, we can write:
−0.5n < 2k∗∗ − 2k′′ + 2k′ − 2k∗ < 0.5n.
Thus, 0 remains the only possible value for C3. The values {2k∗∗ , 2k′′ , 2k′ , 2k∗}
are distinct since there are no repetitions in the columns of the sequence matrix.
Since 2k
′′
> 2k
∗∗
+ 2k
′
+ 2k
∗
, due to a geometric series argument (the largest
element is greater than the sum of all previous elements), we can state that
2k
∗∗ − 2k′′ + 2k′ − 2k∗ < 0.
We conclude that there is no integer constant C3 satisfying our assumption
m′ + 2k
∗
= m′′ + 2k
∗∗
mod n (i.e., there are two identical indices in the `-
prefixes). 
Armed with these claims, we are ready to continue with the proof. Since all
prefixes are disjoint, the adversary cannot reuse failures of one flow for another.
Thus, the adversary will be able to route one flow to w using a single failure (by
finding a sequence in which w appears at the first position); to add another flow,
the adversary takes a sequence δi in which w is located at position 2 and will
fail the links (vi, vn), and (v(δi,1)+1, vn). And so on. Thus, the number of used
failures can be represented as
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + · · ·+ L ≤ ϕ
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Fig. 2. Like Figure 4, but under random failures.
 1
 10
 100
 1000
10 100 1
F R
E
Q
LOAD
n=500, single dest, eclipse, 150 failures
ROB
RFS
DFS
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
10 100 1
F R
E
Q
LOAD
n=500, single dest, eclipse, 450 failures
ROB
RFS
Fig. 3. Load distribution over links.
where L is the number of flows passing through w on the way to the destination
vn. So:
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + · · ·+ L ≤ ϕ
L(L+ 1)
2
≤ ϕ
L <
√
2ϕ.
Note that the index of the destination node (n− 1 in our case) can appear
inside the failover sequences. In this case, the index will be skipped since the
link to it from the source already failed. By skipping one index, we shorten the
failover sequence by 1, and since every sequence has length blog nc, our failover
scheme holds for any ϕ < blog nc. 
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4 Beyond Worst-Case Failures
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Fig. 5. Max load in all-to-all communi-
cation.
To complement our worst-case bounds,
we conducted simulations with differ-
ent failure scenarios. (1) Ran: links
are failed uniformly at random; (2)
Ecl (an “eclipse attack”): links are
removed at random around destina-
tion vn. We used two traffic patterns.
(1) Single dest: one unit of flow from
each node to vn; (2) all-to-all: one
unit of flow from each node to every
other node. In addition to our failover
schemes RFS and DFS, we also simu-
late the following naive strategies. (1)
Bal (“balanced”): If the destination
cannot be reached directly, forward to
an available port chosen uniformly at
random (depending on the destination
and the set of failed links). This strat-
egy seeks to balance traffic but does
not ensure loop-freeness. (2) Rob (“robust”): If the destination cannot be reached,
forward to the available neighboring switch which has the lowest identifier (in a
modulo manner, and assuming that switches have unique identifiers). We start
with the single dest traffic pattern. Figure 4 (left) plots the load as a function of
the number of failed links under Ecl. (Note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis.)
We observe that compared to Theorem 5 which deals with worst-case failures,
RFS performs significantly better: while our conservative bound suggests that
to create a load of 10 =
√
ϕ, ϕ/ log n = 100/ log 500 = 11.15 failures are needed,
more than 300 are necessary in our experiment. Moreover, we observe that RFS
yields a much lower load than the naive approach Rob; for the single-destination
scenario, Bal is similar to Rob and is not shown explicitly here. The DFS
algorithm also gives a low load; however, it is only defined up to a certain ϕ (see
Theorem 6). The variance of these experiments is typically small, see the boxplot
in Figure 4 (right).
As expected, under Ran failures, the load is generally lower, and our scheme
can tolerate more failures without creating loops (see Figure 2).
As the maximal link load reveals a partial picture only, Figure 3 studies the
load distribution over multiple links (under Ecl), once for 150 failures (left) and
once for 450 failures (right). Obviously, most links hardly contain more than one
or two flows under RFS; again, under the naive Rob strategy (and similarly for
Bal), the situation is worse.
Let us have a look at alternative traffic matrices. Figure 5 shows the results
for an all-to-all communication pattern (under Ran). Interestingly, for RFS, the
load is not much higher than in the single-destination scenario; this confirms the
good load-balancing properties of RFS. However, we also see that DFS performs
poorly and needs to be generalized for the multi-destination scenario. Finally, we
note that in this scenario, we can exploit Bal’s flexibility and in contrast to the
single destination case, the algorithm significantly outperforms Rob (in terms of
load).
5 Related Work
This work is motivated by the trend towards Software-Defined Networking and
in particularly the fast failover mechanism which supports the in-band masking
of failures (see Section 5.8 of the OpenFlow 1.1 specification). However, as the
convergence time of routing algorithms is often relatively high compared to packet
forwarding speeds, ranging from 10s of milliseconds to seconds depending on the
network [1], many networks today incorporate some robustness already in the
forwarding tables of a router or switch: Thus, robust routing concepts and link
protection schemes have been studied intensively for many years, also outside
SDN.
For example, robust Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) supports local
and global path protection to compute shortest backup paths around an outage
area [6,10], where “shortest” is often meant in terms of congestion [7,11]. Related
to our connectivity and load-balancing tradeoff is also the work by Suchara et
al. [9] who analyze how to jointly optimize traffic engineering and failure recovery
from pre-installed MPLS backup paths. However, in contrast to our paper, their
solution is path-based and not local, and the focus is on robust optimization.
Alternative solutions to make routing more resilient rely on special header bits
(e.g., to determine when to switch from primary to backup paths, as in MPLS Fast
Reroute [6], or to encode failure information to make failure-aware forwarding
decisions [2,4]), or on fly table modifications [3]. Recently, Feigenbaum et al. [1]
made an interesting first step towards a better theoretical understanding of
resilient SDN tables. The authors prove that routing tables can provide guaranteed
resilience (i.e., loop-freeness) against a single failure, when the network remains
connected.
6 Conclusion
So, will or won’t you shoot in your foot with fast failover? Our results show
that there exists an interesting tradeoff between a “safe” and “efficient” failover.
The usefulness of the local failover depends on whether link failures are rather
adversarial or random, and on how flexibly the failover rules can be specified.
In particular, we have seen that the possibilities of destination-based failover
schemes are very limited. But also more expressive failover schemes where flows
can be forwarded depending on arbitrary local matching rules (this is more
general than today’s OpenFlow specification), can lead to high network loads
in the worst case. On the positive side, relatively simple algorithms exist which
match these lower bounds.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Chen Avin for valuable discus-
sions and advice.
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A Algorithms Bal and Rob
The Bal algorithm is executed sequentially for each node vi and for each failed
link incident to vi chooses the new next hop based on the current node (vi) and
the second end of the currently failed link.
Algorithm 1 Bal
Input: current node – vi, second end of failed link – vj
Output: new next hop
1: if i > j then
2: next hop = (i+ j + 1) mod n
3: else
4: next hop = (i− j + 1) mod n
5: while (vi, vnext hop) is failed do
6: next hop = (next hop+ 1) mod n
7: return next hop
The Rob algorithm always selects the next available neighbor as the new
next hop.
Algorithm 2 Rob
Input: current node – vi
Output: new next hop
1: next hop = (i+ 1) mod n
2: while (vi, vnext hop) is failed do
3: next hop = (next hop+ 1) mod n
4: return next hop
B Discussion
In this section we take a broader look at the problem and study additional
scenarios and adversarial models.
B.1 Realistic Adversary
So far, we have concentrated on a worst-case adversary which fails exactly those
links which will lead to the highest load. We now want to have a look at a more
realistic, “weak adversary” Ran, who fails links at random (independently of the
installed failover rules).
Theorem 9. Using the RFS failover scheme, in order to create a load of
√
ϕ,
Ran will have to fail at least Ω (ϕ) links w.h.p. The same results hold even if
Ran knows the destination of the traffic.
Proof. We build upon the proof of Theorem 5. Let us assume that Ran knows the
destination node vn. Then, it will only fail the links incident to the destination:
Consider any failover sequence δi and assume that the j first nodes in this
sequence are already in use as backup nodes. In order to make use of the node
j + 1, the adversary needs to fail either the link (δi,j , vn) or the link (δi,j−1, δi,j).
If the adversary will fail only links to the destination vn, the probability of
reaching the node δi,j+1 is at least 1/n, while a random link selection will succeed
only with probability 2/(n(n− 1)). Moreover, such failures (i.e., failures of links
towards the destination) can be reused better (see Claim 4).
From the proof of Theorem 5, we know that the minimal total prefix length
(i.e., the sum of all
√
ϕ-prefixes) of any node w is ϕ8 logn and the number of
distinct nodes in the prefix is at least d = 0.4ϕ8 logn =
0.05ϕ
logn ≥ 0.03ϕlnn . The number
of possible total prefixes is
(
n−1√
ϕ
)
. We now ask the following question: if the
adversary fails r (of course r > d) random links adjacent to the destination, what
is the probability that these failures will cover at least one possible total prefix?
First, we will compute the probability p1 that r random failures will cover a
single total prefix (with d distinct nodes); subsequently, we will apply a union
bound argument over all possible total prefixes. Simple combinatorics give us the
expression for p1:
p1 =
(
n−d
r−d
)(
n
r
) = (n− d)!r!
(r − d)!n! .
Using Stirling’s approximation for the factorial, we have:
√
2pi · a0.5+ae−a ≤ a! ≤ e · a0.5+ae−a.
Therefore,
p1 ≤ e(n− d)
0.5+(n−d)e−(n−d)e · r0.5+re−r√
2pi(r − d)0.5+(r−d)e−(r−d)√2pi · n0.5+ne−n
=
e2(n− d)0.5+(n−d)r0.5+r
2pi(r − d)0.5+(r−d)n0.5+n
≤ 1.2n
0.5+(n−d)r0.5+r
(r − d)0.5+(r−d)n0.5+n
= 1.2n−dr0.5+r(r − d)−(0.5+(r−d))
=
(
1.2(r − d)−0.5)n−dr0.5+r(r − d)−(r−d)
≤ n−dr0.5+r(r − d)−(r−d) (3)
= e−d lnn+(0.5+r) ln r−(r−d) ln (r−d).
The Equation (3) is true since r > d, and assuming that r − d ≥ 2, we get:
1.2(r−d)−0.5 ≤ 1. Now recall that d = 0.03ϕlnn , and take r = d lnn = 0.03ϕ. Then:
p1 ≤ e−0.03ϕ+(0.5+0.03ϕ) ln 0.03ϕ−
0.03ϕ(lnn−1)
lnn
ln
0.03ϕ(lnn−1)
lnn
= e
0.03ϕ
(
−1+( 0.5
0.03ϕ
+1) ln 0.03ϕ−(1− 1
lnn
) ln
0.03ϕ(lnn−1)
lnn
)
= e
0.03ϕ
(
−1+ 0.5 ln 0.03ϕ
0.03ϕ
+ ln 0.03ϕ
lnn
−(1− 1
lnn
) ln lnn−1
lnn
)
= e
0.03ϕ
(
−1+ ln 0.03ϕ
0.1ϕ
+ ln 0.03ϕ
lnn
+(1− 1
lnn
) ln lnn
lnn−1
)
.
Using the following Taylor expansion (for a > 1):
ln
a
a− 1 = − ln
(
1− 1
a
)
=
∞∑
i=1
1
iai
=
1
a
+
1
2a2
+
∞∑
i=3
1
iai
≤ 1
a
+
1
2a2
+
1
2a2
≤ 1
a
+
1
a2
,
we obtain
p1 ≤ e0.03ϕ
(
−1+ ln 0.03ϕ
0.1ϕ
+ ln 0.03ϕ
lnn
+(1− 1
lnn
)
(
1
lnn
+ 1
ln2 n
))
= e
0.03ϕ
lnn
(
− lnn+ ln 0.03ϕ lnn
0.1ϕ
+ln 0.03ϕ+(lnn−1)
(
1
lnn
+ 1
ln2 n
))
= e
0.03ϕ
lnn
(
− lnn+ ln 0.03ϕ lnn
0.1ϕ
+ln 0.03ϕ+1+ 1
lnn
− 1
lnn
− 1
ln2 n
)
.
Note that ϕ ≤ n and thus for ϕ ≥ 10 ln4 n,
ln 0.03ϕ lnn
0.1ϕ
≤ 1
ln2 n
.
We can write:
p1 ≤ e
0.03ϕ
lnn (− lnn+ln 0.03ϕ+1)
≤ e 0.03ϕlnn (− lnn+ln 0.03n+1)
≤ e 0.03ϕlnn (−2.5)
= e
−0.075ϕ
lnn .
Since e−
0.075ϕ
lnn ≤ e− ϕ80 logn , we can use the union bound from the proof of
Theorem 5 (see Equation (2) in that proof): we conclude that for ϕ ≥ 822 log4 n,
in order to create a load of
√
ϕ, a weak adversary will have to fail at least
r = d lnn = 0.03ϕ links with probability of at least 1− 1n2 . 
B.2 Multiple Destinations
We can also generalize the traffic model: instead of having a single destination,
each node vi for all i ∈ [1, . . . , n] needs to send one unit of flow to each other
node vj with j 6= i. We can adapt the RFS scheme in the sense that we generate(
n
2
)
random failover permutations, one for each source-destination pair. Note that
this corresponds to a matrix representation δ·,· with
(
n
2
)
rows and n− 2 columns.
Again, the permutations ensure loop-freeness.
Theorem 10. Using the (generalized) RFS failover scheme, in order to load a
node with ϕ flows (0 < ϕ < n), the adversary will have to fail Θ(ϕ) links.
Proof. In the generalized RFS, we have n(n − 1) failover sequences: each set
of n− 1 sequences are for a specific destination. Consider now the first column
of this n(n− 1)× (n− 2) matrix. Since there are n(n− 1) rows, there exists a
node w that appears at least n− 1 times in the first column. Now, for each row
i in which δi,1 = w, the adversary can fail the link from vi to the appropriate
destination, thus making the flow to go through w. Hence, a single failure is
enough to bring an additional flow to w, i.e., the adversary needs at most ϕ
failures in order to create a load of ϕ on w.
It remains to show that these failures cannot be reused by the adversary, i.e.,
the adversary indeed will need to invest ϕ failures. The argument is simple. In
order to create a load of ϕ on w, the adversary has to ‘finish’ the prefixes of ϕ
sequences. In order to do so, it first needs to fail the direct (v1, vn) link of every
such sequence, i.e., for each sequence at least this link has to be failed. But these
links are unique (each sequence serves a different source-destination pair) and
thus cannot be reused. The last implies that the adversary indeed needs to invest
at least ϕ failures. 
